ALBUM
PERJUANGAN
OLEH: BATARA R. HUTAGALUNG
·
Rabu, 08 November
2017, 13:50 WIB
SETELAH disepakati truce (gencatan senjata) tanggal 30
Oktober, pimpinan sipil dan militer pihak Indonesia, serta pimpinan militer
Inggris bersama-sama keliling kota dengan iring-iringan mobil, untuk
menyebarluaskan kesepakatan tersebut. Dari 8 pos pertahanan Inggris, enam di
antaranya tidak ada masalah, hanya di dua tempat, yakni di Gedung Lindeteves
dan Gedung Internatio yang masih ada permasalahan/tembak-menembak.
Setelah berhasil mengatasi kesulitan di Gedung Lindeteves, rombongan
Indonesia-Inggris segera menuju Gedung Internatio, pos pertahanan Inggris
terakhir yang bermasalah. Ketika rombongan tiba di lokasi tersebut pada petang
hari, nampak bahwa gedung tersebut dikepung oleh ratusan pemuda Indonesia.
Setelah meliwati Jembatan Merah, tujuh kendaraan memasuki area dan berhenti di
depan gedung. Para pemimpin Indonesia segera keluar kendaraan dan meneriakkan
kepada massa, supaya menghentikan tembak-menembak.
Kapten Shaw, Mohammad Mangundiprojo dan T.D. Kundan ditugaskan masuk ke
gedung untuk menyampaikan kepada tentara Inggris yang bertahan di dalam gedung,
hasil perundingan antara Inggris dengan Indonesia. Mallaby ada di dalam mobil
yang diparkir di depan Gedung Internatio. Beberapa saat setelah rombongan
masuk, terlihat T.D. Kundan bergegas keluar dari gedung, dan tak lama kemudian,
terdengar bunyi tembakan dari arah gedung. Tembakan ini langsung dibalas oleh
pihak Indonesia. Tembak-menembak berlangsung sekitar dua jam. Setelah
tembak-menembak dapat dihentikan, terlihat mobil Mallaby hancur dan Mallaby
sendiri ditemukan telah tewas.
Ada dua kejadian pada tanggal 30 Oktober 1945, yang pada waktu itu
dilemparkan oleh Inggris ke pihak Indonesia, sebagai yang bertanggung jawab,
dan kemudian dijadikan alasan Mansergh untuk menghukum para ekstremis dengan
mengeluarkan ultimatum tanggal 9 November 1945:
1.
Orang-orang Indonesia memulai penembakan, dan dengan demikian
telah melanggar gencatan senjata (truce),
2.
Orang-orang Indonesia secara licik telah membunuh Brigjen
Mallaby.
Tewasnya Mallaby memang sangat kontroversial, tetapi mengenai siapa yang
memulai menembak, di kemudian hari cukup jelas. Kesaksian tersebut justru
datangnya dari pihak Inggris. Ini berdasarkan keterangan beberapa perwira
Inggris yang diberikan kepada beberapa pihak. Yang paling menarik adalah yang
disampaikan kepada Tom Driberg, seorang Anggota Parlemen Inggris dari Partai
Buruh (Labour).
Pada 20 Februari 1946, dalam perdebatan di
Parlemen (House of Commons) Tom Driberg, menyampaikan: …some of the
press reports from Indonesia have been entirely responsible. In particular, I
have learned from officers who have recently returned that some of the stories
which have been told, not only in the newspaper, but, I am sorry to say, from
the Government Front Bench in his House, have been very far from accurate and
have innecessarily imparted prejudice and concerns the lamented death of
Brigadier Mallaby. That was announced to us as a foul murder, and we accepted
it as such. I have learned from officers who were present when it happened the
exact details and it is perfectly clear that Brigadier Mallaby was not murdered
but was honourably killed in action. The incident was somewhat confused as such
incidents are but it took place in and near Union Square in Surabaya. There had
been discussions about a truce earlier in the day. A large crowd of Indonesians
a mob if you like had gathered in the square and were in a rather excited
state.
About 20 Indians, in a building on the other side of the square, had been cut
off from telephonic communication and did not know about the truce. They were
firing sporadically on the mob. Brigadier Mallaby came out from the
discussions, walked straight into the crowd, with great courage, and shouted to
the Indians to cease fire. They obeyed him. Possibly half an hour later, the
mob in the square became turbulent again. Brigadier Mallaby, at a certain point
in the proceedings, ordered the Indians to open fire again. They opened fire
with two Bren Guns and the mob dispersed and went to cover; then fighting broke
out again in good earnest. It is apparent that when Brigadier Mallaby gave the
order to open fire again, the truce was in fact broken, at any rate locally.
Twenty minutes to half an hour after that, he was unfortunately killed in his
car although it is not absolutely certain whether he was killed by Indonesians
who were approaching his car; which exploded simultaneously with the attack on
him.
I do not think this amounts to charge of foul murder because my information
came absolutely at first hand from a British officer who was actually on the
spot at the moment, whose bona fides I have no reason to question.
Di sini Tom Driberg meragukan bahwa Mallaby
terbunuh oleh orang Indonesia. Dia menyatakan: it is not absolutely certain
whether he was killed by Indonesians who were approaching his car; which
exploded simultaneously with the attack on him.
Selanjutnya dia juga membantah bahwa tewasnya
Mallaby akibat dibunuh secara licik (foully murdered). Kelihatannya
pihak pimpinan tentara Inggris untuk membangkitkan/memperkuat rasa antipati
terhadap Indonesia rela mendegradasi kematian seorang perwira tinggi menjadi
dibunuh secara licik daripada menyatakan killed in action tewas dalam
pertempuran yang menjadi kehormatan bagi setiap prajurit.
Juga penuturan Venu K. Gopal, waktu itu
berpangkat Mayor, yang adalah Komandan Kompi D, Batalion 6, Mahratta. Kompi D
ini mengambil tempat pertahanan di Gedung Internatio. Tanggal 8 Agustus 1974,
dia menulis kepada J.G.A. Parrot antara lain: Let me first give you
some background. Coy had been under fire off and on and had already casualties.
The firing came from other buildings on the square and by and large we were
able to contain it. We could, however, see that armed men barred all the exits
from the square. Meanwhile armed Indonesians swarmed over to the veranda of the
building and I had to bluntly tell them that I would fire if they started
pressing into the building. By this time I could not see Brigade Mallaby or the
LOs (Liaison Officers) because of the crowds on the veranda.
Just then Capt. Shaw and Kundan (I did not know their names at that
time) tried to get into the building but were prevented. Kundan then shouted to
the crowd that he would get us surrender and he and Capt. Shaw were then
allowed to go into the building if they took an Indonesian officer with them. I
allowed them in hoping to play for time. After a little time Kundan went out of
the building, leaving Capt. Shaw and the Indonesian Officer behind. Soon
thereafter the armed men started pushing in and I was left with no option but
to open fire. The Decision was mine and mine alone. Capt. Smith is correct when
he says that BM (Mallaby-pen.) did not give any orders to Capt. Shaw.
Dengan pengakuan Mayor Gopal, Komandan Kompi D
yang bertahan di Gedung Internatio, sekarang terbukti, bahwa yang memulai
menembak adalah pihak Inggris; tetapi kelihatannya dia masih ingin melindungi
bekas atasannya dengan menggarisbawahi bahwa perintah menembak tersebut adalah
keputusannya sendiri.
Ini jelas bertentangan dengan kesaksian T.D.
Kundan, yang diperkuat dengan kesaksian seorang perwira Inggris melalui Tom
Driberg. Dengan pengakuan ini terlihat jelas, bahwa Inggris pada waktu itu
memutar balikkan fakta dan menuduh bahwa gencatan senjata telah dilanggar pihak
Indonesia (the truce which had been broken). Di dalam situasi tegang
bunyi ledakan ataupun tembakan akan menimbulkan kepanikan pada
kelompok-kelompok yang masih diliputi suasana tempur, sehingga tembakan
tersebut segera dibalas; maka pertempuran di seputar Gedung Internatio pun
pecah lagi.
Dari pengakuan kedua perwira Inggris tersebut
telah jelas, bahwa pemicu terjadinya tembak-menembak adalah pihak Inggris
sendiri. Dugaan ini sebenarnya tepat,
bila disimak jalan pikiran Mallaby, seperti dituliskan oleh Capt. Smith: He
(Mallaby, red.) did not believe in the safe-conducts in so far as it applied to
us, but thought that some at least of the Company might get away. Accordingly
Capt. Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders.
Sebelum itu, menurut Smith, telah terjadi
perbedaan pendapat antara Kapten Shaw dan Mallaby mengenai permintaan para
pemuda Indonesia, agar tentara Inggris meninggalkan persenjataan mereka di
dalam gedung. Awalnya, Kapten Shaw menyetujui permintaan ini, tetapi Mallaby
kemudian membatalkannya.
Smith: Eventually, the mob demanded that the
troops in the building laid (sic) down their arms and marched (sic) out: they
and us (sic) guaranteed a safeconduct back to the air field. The Brigadier
flatly refused to consider this proposal. After further pressure, however,
Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the indonesians through his job as
FSO, and who had been a considerable strain since our arrival in Surabaya,
agreed to the terms on his own responsibility. The Brigadier at once
countemanded this.
Uraian Tom Driberg di Parlemen Inggris (House of
Commons) kelihatannya keterangannya diperoleh dari Kapten Shaw, ajudan Mallaby
pada waktu itu.
Kemudian tuduhan kedua bahwa orang Indonesia
secara licik membunuh Mallaby, perlu diteliti lebih lanjut. Di pihak Indonesia
banyak orang mengaku bahwa dialah yang menembak Mallaby. Hj. Lukitaningsih I.
Rajamin-Supandhan mencatat, ada sekitar 12 orang yang mengaku sebagai yang
menembak Mallaby. Namun menurut penilaian beberapa pelaku sejarah,
dari sejumlah keterangan yang diberikan, cerita yang benar kemungkinan besar
yang disampaikan oleh Abdul Azis. (Lihat: Barlan Setiadijaya, 10
November 1945, hlm. 429-435.) Dul Arnowo mencatat laporan seorang saksi mata,
Ali Harun, yang kemudian diteruskan ke Presiden Sukarno. Surat tersebut dibawa
oleh Kolonel dr. W. Hutagalung ke Jakarta, dan diserahkan langsung kepada
Presiden Sukarno pada tanggal 8 November 1945.
Dari berbagai penuturan, memang benar adanya
penembakan dengan menggunakan pistol oleh seorang pemuda Indonesia ke arah
Mallaby, tetapi tidak ada seorang pun yang dapat memastikan, bahwa Mallaby
memang tewas akibat tembakan tersebut. Yang menarik untuk dicermati adalah
pengakuan Kapten R.C. Smith dari Batalyon 6, Resimen Mahratta, yang pada waktu
itu menjabat sebagai Liaison Officer Brigade 49. Tanggal 31 Oktober, dia
memberikan laporannya yang pertama, kemudian pada bulan Februari, sehubungan
dengan keterangan Tom Driberg di House of Commons. Laporan Smith dimuat oleh
J.G.A. Parrot, dalam analisisnya, Who Killed Brigadier Mallaby? Kapten R.C.
Smith menulis: The Report by Capt. R.C. Smith.
At approximately 1230 hrs. on 30th October, Capt T.L. Laughland and I were
ordered by Col. L.H.O.Pugh, DSO, 2i/c (Second in Command) of the Bde., to
proceed to the Government offices, where we were each to collect an Indonesian
representative. From there one of us was to go north, and the other south,
through the town, and try to persuade the mobs to go back to their barracks.
Brigadier Mallaby was at this time in conference with the Governor in the
Government Offices.
On arrival there, we were told by the Brigadier that the Indonesians had
refused to treat with anyone except him. Accordingly we set off with the
Brigadier and the FSO (Field Security Officer), Capt. Shaw, plus the leaders of
the various parties, in several cars, the foremost of which was flying the
white flag.
The first place to which we went was a large building about 150 yards west of
the Kali Mas River, which runs north and south through the town. One Coy of the
6 Mahrattas had been having a very stiff fight in this building against about
five hundred Indonesians, and had been in considerable difficulties.
On our arrival there, the mob was collected round the cars, and the various
party leaders made speeches to them, in an attempt to persuade them to return
to their barracks. The speeches were at first quite well received, and the
necessary promises given.
We then got into our cars and set off for the next position. We had only gone
about 100 yards when we were stopped by the mob aproximately 20 yards from the
Kali Mas. From then on the situation rapidly deteriorated. The mob leaders
began to incite the mob, and the party leaders gradually lost control. The mob,
which up to that time had seemed fairly friendly towards us, became distinctly
menacing: swords were waved, and pistols pointed at us and we were left with
very little doubt as to their intentions.
Eventually, the mob demanded that the troops in the building laid (sic) down
their arms and marched (sic) out: they and us (sic) guaranteed a safe-conduct
back to the air field. The Brigadier flatly refused to consider this proposal.
After further pressure, however, Capt.Shaw, who was well known to some of the
indonesians through his job as FSO, and who had been under a considerable
strain since our arrival in Surabaya, agreed to the terms on his own
responsibility. The Brigadier at once countemanded this: on further
consideration, he decided that the company had been in so bad a position
before, that any further fighting would lead to their being wiped out.
He did not believe in the safe-conduct in so far as it applied to us, but
thought that some at least of the company might get away. Accordingly Capt.
Shaw was sent into the building to give the necessary orders.
The rest of us were disarmed “except for a grenade which Capt. Laughland
managed to keep concealed“ and made to sit in one of the cars.
The Brigadier was on the side nearest to the Kali Mas, Capt. Laughland in the
middle, and myself on the outside nearest to the building in which our troops
were.
When Capt. Shaw got into the building, the Indonesians brought up a machine gun
to cover the entrance. He and the company commander decided that any attempt to
walk out unarmed would lead to a massacre and so the order to open fire was
given.
As soon as the firing started, the three of us who were in the car crouched
down on the floor as far as possible. An Indonesian came up to the Brigadier
window with a rifle. He fired four shots at three of us, all of which missed.
He went away while we shammed dead. The battle went on for about two and a half
hours, to about 2030 hrs, by which time it was dark. At the end of that time,
the firing died down to some extent, and we could hear shouting as though the
Indonesians were being collected. Two of them came up to the car and attempted
to drive it away. That failed and one of them opened the back door on the
Brigadier side.
The Brigadier moved, and as they saw from that, that he was still alive, he
spoke to them and asked to be taken to one of the party leaders. The two
Indonesians went away to discuss this, and one of them came back to the front
door on the Brigadier side. The Brigadier spoke to him again, the Indonesian
answered, and then suddenly reached his hand in through the front window, and
shot the Brigadier. It took from fifteen seconds to half-a-minute for the
Brigadier to die, but from the noise he made at the end, there was absolutely
no doubt that he was dead. (Notes from Parrot: This was the first time that
these details of the final moments of Brigadier Mallaby had been made public.
In this second report Smith offered the following explanation: In the report
made by Capt.Laughland and myself the following morning we stated that the
Brigadier was killed instantly. This was done in order to spare the feelings of
the family.
As soon as he had fired, the Indonesian ducked down beside the car, and
remained there until after the Brigadier was dead. I took the pin out of the
grenade which Capt.Laughland had previously passed to me, and waited. The Indonesian
appeared again, and fired another shot which grazed Capt. Laughland shoulder. I
let go the lever of the grenade, held it for two seconds to make sure it was
not returned and threw it out of the open door by Brigadier body. As soon as it
had exploded,
Capt. Laughland and I went out of the door on my side of the car, waited for a
short time, then ran around the car and dived into the Kali Mas. As the two
Indonesians by the side of the car did not attemp to interfere with us it is
presumed that they were killed by the grenade which also set the back seat of
the car on fire. After five hours in the Kali Mas, we managed to reach our
troops in the Dock area.
Keterangan Smith ini antara lain menguatkan
penjelasan Gopal bahwa memang benar pihak Inggris yang memulai penembakan.
Kesaksian Smith ini mirip dengan keterangan Abdul Azis; dan ternyata dia
tidak mati seperti dugaan Smith.
Sehubungan dengan penembakan dengan senapan yang
terjadi sebelum penembakan terhadap Mallaby, dalam surat kepada Parrot
tertanggal 23 November 1973, Smith menulis antara lain: I have no idea what
hapenned to the four shots from the rifleman. He approached the car from the
left (the Brigadiers side) with the rifle at the ready, and looking at the
three of us. I am not ashamed to say at this point I shut my eyes and started
counting the shots!
I think all three of us were equally surprised at finding both ourselves and
the others alive afterwards!
Tentu sangat luar biasa, bahwa menembak tiga
orang yang sedang duduk di dalam mobil yang sempit dengan empat tembakan, namun
tak satupun yang mengena. Hal ini menunjukkan, bahwa dapat dipastikan, pemilik
senapan itu baru pertama kali menembak, sehingga menembak tiga orang dengan
jarak mungkin paling tinggi 2 meter, empat tembakan meleset semua.
Mengenai ciri-ciri penembak Mallaby, dalam surat
kepada Parrot tanggal 20 Februari 1974, Smith menulis: the indonesian who killed the Brigadier was a
young lad around 16 or 17 approximately, but it was too dark to see whether he
was wearing any sort of uniform. The weapon was an automatic pistol.
Kemudian pada 20 Februari 1974, Smith menulis
kepada Parrot yang isinya antara lain: I have no recollection of the
conversation that the Indian interpreter reported and while I certainly could not
state that I heard everything that happenned, I think I should have remembered
this, if not now after 30 years, certainly at the time when I wrote my report.
However, in all fairness, I must say that there were moments when my attention
was distracted from the Brigadier myself. For instance, I can remember spending
some time trying to convince a very angry young Indonesian that I had not
personally be responsible for his brother death.
Going back to my report, the position of all of us was very closely gouped
around one car so that there was only a matter of a very few feet between us.
Therefore, Brigadier Mallaby was certainly able to hear when Captain Shaw
agreed to the demands of the mob, which was why he was able to countermand it
immediately. As I said, he then changed his mind in the hope that some of the
men at least might reach safety, but the orders that he gave Captain Shaw were
that the troops in the building should lay down their arms and come out
unarmed, in the hope of safe conduct.
I definitely did not hear any suggestion that they should be ordered to open
fire after a certain length of time had elapsed. The one thing that has always
been quite firmly established in my memory is that the orders to fire were
given by Captain Shaw once he had got into the building.
Yang perlu diragukan di sini adalah dugaan
Smith, bahwa Mallaby tewas sebagai akibat tembakan pistol pemuda Indonesia.
Seperti dalam tulisannya, dia mengatakan bahwa pada saat itu sekitar pukul
20.30 dan keadaan gelap. Memang aliran listrik di daerah tersebut telah diputus
oleh pihak Indonesia. Dia hanya mengatakan: berdasarkan suara yang didengar
dari arah Mallaby, dia yakin bahwa Mallaby telah tewas 15 sampai 30 detik
setelah ditembak dengan pistol.
Selain itu dia juga mengakui, bahwa granat yang
dilemparkannya melewati tubuh Mallaby telah mengakibatkan terbakarnya jok
belakang mobil mereka, artinya tempat Mallaby duduk. Menurut pemeriksaan di
rumah sakit, jenazah Mallaby sangat sulit dikenali, karena hangus dan hancur.
Dia dikenali melalui tanda bekas jam tangan di kedua lengannya, karena Mallaby
dikenal dengan kebiasaannya untuk memakai dua jam tangan; jadi bukan
identifikasi wajah atau ciri-ciri tubuh lain. Hal ini disampaikan oleh dr.
Sugiri, kepada Kolonel dr. W. Hutagalung.
Seandainya keterangan Smith benar, bahwa Mallaby
tidak memberikan perintah untuk memulai menembak, bahkan sebaliknya, yaitu
menginstruksikan Kapten Shaw untuk memerintahkan tentara Inggris yang di dalam
gedung agar mereka meletakkan senjata dan ke luar gedung tanpa senjata, maka
telah terjadi pembangkangan yang berakibat fatal, yaitu perintah dari komandan
kompi, Mayor Gopal, untuk memulai menembak. Dilihat dari sudut mana pun,
timbulnya tembak-menembak yang berakibat tewasnya Mallaby, adalah kesalahan tentara
Inggris.
Mengenai tuduhan bahwa Mallaby tewas akibat
tembakan pistol, sangat diragukan. Jelas untuk membela diri, Smith dan
Laughland harus menyatakan dahulu bahwa Mallaby telah tewas ketika Smith
melemparkan granat, yang kemudian justru membakar bagian belakang mobil yang
mereka dan Mallaby tumpangi. Beberapa saksi mata di pihak Indonesia mengatakan
bahwa mobil Mallaby meledak akibat granat tersebut sehingga dengan demikian,
boleh dikatakan Mallaby tewas karena kesalahan pihak Inggris sendiri. Dari kronologi
kejadian dapat disimpulkan, bahwa Mallaby tewas karena tembak-menembak berkobar
lagi.
Yang sangat menarik untuk dicermati sehubungan dengan pelemparan granat
oleh Kapten Smith, adalah kesaksian Imam Sutrisno Trisnaningprojo, seorang
pemuda berpangkat kapten, mantan anggota PETA. Trisnaningprojo ikut dalam
iring-iringan mobil dalam rangka penyebarluasan hasil kesepakatan
Sukarno-Hawthorn. Bahwa Smith adalah orang yang melemparkan granat yang
mengakibatkan mobil yang ditumpangi Mallaby terbakar, diakui oleh Smith
sendiri, tetapi Trisnaningprodjo menuturkan, bahwa Smith tidak berada di dalam
mobil bersama Mallaby, melainkan bersama Laughland di luar mobil ketika terjadi
penembakan terhadap Mallaby. Trisnaningprojo melihat, Smith berada di dekat
gedung dan melemparkan granat ke arah pemuda yang menembak Mallaby, tetapi
granat meledak di sebelah mobil Mallaby yang pintu belakangnya terbuka. Jadi,
Captain Smith melempar granat tidak dari dalam mobil, melainkan dari luar
mobil. Ini berarti bahwa tidak ada yang mengetahui kondisi Mallaby setelah
penembakan dari pemuda Indonesia tersebut, apakah terluka atau memang telah
tewas seperti penuturan Smith.
Baik dari kesaksian Smith, maupun keterangan
Trisnaningprojo yang dilengkapi sketsa lokasi pada saat kejadian, pemuda
Indonesia menembak dengan pistol ke arah Mallaby melalui jendela depan di sisi
kiri mobil, sedangkan Mallaby masih menurut Smith duduk di jok belakang, di
sisi paling kiri. Dari posisi pemuda Indonesia tersebut, walaupun dia
menggunakan tangan kiri, kemungkinan besar bagian tubuh Mallaby sebelah kanan
yang akan terkena tembakan, dan ini biasanya tidak mematikan. Berbeda, apabila
yang terkena adalah tubuh bagian kiri, di bagian jantung.
Di samping itu, juga tidak ada yang bisa
memastikan, bahwa tembakan pemuda tersebut benar mengenai sasaran karena
sebelumnya juga menurut Smith ketika bertiga masih duduk di bagian belakang
mobil, ada yang menembak ke arah mereka dengan senapan sebanyak empat kali,
namun tak satu peluru pun yang mengenai mereka. Tidak tertutup kemungkinan,
bahwa pemuda yang menembak dengan pistol, juga baru pertama kali memegang
pistol, sehingga belum mahir menggunakannya.
Ketika diwawancarai oleh Ben Anderson pada
tanggal 13 Agustus 1962, Dul Arnowo menyatakan, bahwa dia yakin Mallaby secara
tidak sengaja telah terbunuh oleh anak buahnya sendiri.
Dalam laporan rahasia kepada atasannya, Kolonel
Laurens van der Post mantan Gubernur Militer Inggris di Batavia/Jakarta tahun
1945, menuliskan (Sir Laurens van der Post, The Admiral Baby, John Murray,
London, 1996): The detail of what happenned at Sourabaya is not really
relevant to this review but it is interresting that the very latest evidence
suggests that the Mallaby murder, far from being premiditatet or a deliberate
breach of faith, was caused more by the indescribable confusion and nervous
excitement of everyone in the town. Had General Hawthorn, the General Officer
Commanding Java at the same time, had proper Civil Affairs and political
officers on his staff to draft his unfortunate proclamations for him and to
keep [in] continuous and informed contact with population, the story of
Sourabaya may well have been different.
Penulis Merupakan Sejarawan; Ketua Komite Utang Kehormatan Belanda (KUKB)
Sumber : https://rmol.id/politik/read/2017/11/08/314346/brigadir-jenderal-mallaby-tewas
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